SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Anderson, Kym; Croser, Johanna L.; Sandri, Damiano; Valenzuela, Ernesto.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price-support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price...

Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural price and trade policies; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; F59; H20; N50; O13.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50305

Masters, William A.; Garcia, Andres F..

This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables, and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political-economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents’ rational ignorance about small per-person effects, governance institutions’ control of rent-seeking by political leaders, governments’ revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy-making. We also find that larger groups obtain more...

Agricultural Protection Growth in Europe, 1870-1969

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural price distortions; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11; H23.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50301

Swinnen, Johan F.M..

Dramatic changes took place in agricultural policies in Europe in the 19th and 20th century. In the 1860s European nations agreed on a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent. In the 1960s European nations concluded an international agreement which spread heavy government intervention and protection against imports across the continent. This paper offers hypotheses as to the causes of these dramatic changes in agricultural protection.

Can politicians calm public fears of food-borne risks or do they adopt excessively stringent preventive measures?: A political economy approach

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Agricultural distortions; High-income countries; Economic development of Europe; F13; N53; O13; Q18; P16.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50296

Arahata, Katsumi.

The purpose of this paper is to examine politically sensitive food safety problems from the viewpoint of political economy. The model was built in order to clarify the behaviors of consumers and politicians, employing the prospect theory and the median voter theorem. Major findings and policy implications in this study are as follows: Firstly, as an outcome of the theoretical analysis, it is suggested that politicians may magnify consumers’ excessive response to food scares. Secondly, several countervailing factors that can mitigate such consumers’ excessive responses may exist. Nevertheless, in Japan, they may be weak or may have become weak and do not mitigate such excessive responses. Finally, it is recommended that politicians’ staff or...

Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium

Palavras-chave: Food safety; Political economy; The prospect theory; The median voter theorem; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Political Economy; Public Economics; Q18.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51621

Roe, Terry L.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore.

A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern.

Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter?

Palavras-chave: General equilibrium; Political economy; Rent seeking; Lobbying; Political Economy.

Ano: 1990

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7483

Ando, Amy Whritenour.

This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten (respectively) the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well.

Economia política da disputa por terras em Minas Gerais

Palavras-chave: Duration analysis; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10564

Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco de; Shikida, Claudio; Alvarenga, Patricia Silva.

The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land (conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logit model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Agrarian development; Political economy; Regional economics; Agribusiness; D72; D74; O43.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61236

Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest-Group Behavior

Ando, Amy Whritenour.

This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications.

Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model

Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903

Schleich, Joachim; Orden, David.

This paper generalizes the recent political economy model of Helpman and Grossman in which contributions by producer lobbies and government decisions about trade policies are modeled as a common agency game. We allow the government to choose among domestic as well as trade interventions. When production and trade policies are available, the equilibrium production policies serve the lobbies while the trade policies reflect the country's international market power. When consumption and trade policies are available, tariffs and export subsidies are applied in a small-country model to serve the special interests, and the domestic policies are selected to restore consumer prices to world levels. In a large-country model, the optimal consumption and trade...

Environmental payments in conflicting situations between nature provision and cost minimization: a political economy approach

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Trade policies; Domestic subsidies and taxes; Efficient policies; Common agency; International Relations/Trade; F11; F13.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7458

Nuppenau, Ernst-August.

We will analyze a newly emerging conflict within the second pillar of the rural development policy of the EU: a conflict between those farmers, who want to participate in high nature value agriculture, and farmers, who feel negatively impacted by supporting nature provision. We see a link through competition for land between nature provision in agriculture and cost minimal production of commercial farmers. The idea is to model this conflict using a political bargain approach and make a contribution on how to solve the conflict by innovative institutional arrangements. The power of groups will be analyzed and what governments can do.

Evaluating rural development policy - review of the CMEF

Palavras-chave: Conflict; Political economy; Nature provision; Community/Rural/Urban Development.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95313

Huelemeyer, Kerstin; Schiller, Simone.

With the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) a guidance document for evaluation of rural development policy has been published by the European Commission. The CMEF defines the requirements on monitoring and evaluation and specifies a limited number of quantitative common indicators applicable to each programme. While in general the introduction of the CMEF is considered as being a helpful tool for carrying out evaluation, substantial criticism has been expressed regarding the suggested methodological approach and the provided set of impact indicators. Based on qualitative analyses, this article focuses on contributing to a better understanding of the evaluation process in order to learn from stakeholder perceptions and draw conclusions on how...

Evaluating the 1996 EU food aid reform: Did it really lead to better targeting?

Palavras-chave: Evaluation; CMEF; Indicators; Political economy; Success factors; Community/Rural/Urban Development.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94920

Maas, Sarah.

The paper analyses the 1996 EU food aid reform and addresses the question of its impact on improving EU food aid allocation in terms of reaching those countries which are most vulnerable to food insecurity. Using a two-stage regression model the analysis finds that EU food aid in kind is increasingly targeted towards developing countries affected by food insecurity. Most importantly, characteristics such as low calorie supply and balance-of-payments difficulties gained in importance in EU food aid allocation during the recent years. However, even though progress is noticeable, the results suggest a lack of coordination between the EU and other food aid donors which exacerbates food aid variability and may lower aid effectiveness.

Existence of Equilibria in Lobbying Economics

Palavras-chave: EU food aid; Policy reform; Political economy; Two-stage model; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Security and Poverty; International Development; Political Economy; O13; Q18; Q19.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51618

Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L..

Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an...

Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy.

Ano: 1988

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468

Dutt, Pushan; Mitra, Devashish.

In this paper, we examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. We then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. We find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection...

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural protection; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50299

Food Protection for Sale

Lopez, Rigoberto A.; Matschke, Xenia.

This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter...

Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring

Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; F13; F1; L66; C12.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25195

Ando, Amy Whritenour; Palmer, Karen L..

Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains.

How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control

Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94.

Ano: 1998

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643

Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F..

Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism -the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game- is equal to the tariff that would be set if...

Institutions and EU Decisions-Making: the 'Power' of the European Commission

Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Protectionism; Tariff; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q17; Q56; Q57.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10770

Pokrivcak, Jan.

I develop a two-stage political economy model that explicitly models the complexity of decision-making in the European Union on the Common Agricultural Policy, and I derive how the institutional design affects the outcome and the influence of the various agents involved, and the likelihood of political stalemate.

Invasive Species Management Through Tariffs: Are Prevention and Protection Synonymous?

Palavras-chave: Political economy; European Union; Common Agricultural Policy; Voting; International Development.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24862

Ranjan, Ram.

This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare...

Is Protection for Sale in U.S. Food Industries?

Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642

Lopez, Rigoberto A.; Hathie, Ibrahima.

This article tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, imports, and political organization of industries. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports, but in unorganized industries protection increases with import penetration. In spite of substantial differences in data sets and empirical procedures, the estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries. Furthermore, the presence of...